Consider a model with finite number of goods, and with buyers with private values and quasi-linear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for a buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism that implements this allocation rule. We prove that a domain of valuations of dimension at least 2 is a monotonicity domain if and only if its closure is convex.
A is the set of all valuation functions on A, that is the set of all real valued functions defined on A. The value of a for a buyer with valuation v is thus va. It is convenient to represent each good a by its associated unit vector e a ∈ R A , where e a a = 1 and e a b = 0 for every b = a. Let Z(A) be the set of all sub-probability vectors z ∈ R A . That is,
We think of D as the set of all possible valuations of a given buyer with quasi-linear utility function, and f is interpreted as a randomized allocation rule in some direct mechanism (D, f, c), where c : D → R; If a buyer with valuation v declares w she receives a with probability f a (w), and therefore she evaluates f (w) by the inner product, v, f (w) = a∈A vaf a (w) minus c(w); If a∈A f a (w) < 1, there is a positive probability that the buyer does not receive any good. In such case the utility of the outside option is assumed to equal zero. A randomized allocation rule satisfying f (v) ∈ {e a |a ∈ A} for every v ∈ D is called a pure allocation rule. A randomized allocation rule f is finite-valued if its range {f (v)|v ∈ D} is a finite set. We say that a randomized allocation rule f is implementable if there exists a function c : D → R such that truth telling is a dominant strategy in the direct mechanism (D, f, c). That * I would like to thank Ron Lavi for very helpful discussions.
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If f is implementable, then a simple manipulation on the implementability condition shows that: We say that a domain of valuation functions is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable. It is well known that every domain of dimension at most one is a monotonicity domain. In our first main theorem we prove: Theorem Every domain with a convex closure is a monotonicity domain. This theorem implies the theorem of Saks and Yu, but with some efforts, it can be directly derived from their theorem. However, to our opinion our proof is significantly simpler than the elaborated proof of Saks and Yu. In our second main theorem we prove: Theorem:The closure of every monotonicity domain of dimension at least 2 is convex. The main tool in proving this is a glowing theorem, where we show that if f is a monotone randomized allocation rule on a convex set D, which is the union of two closed convex sets, and f is cyclically monotone on each of the two convex sets, then f is cyclically monotone on D. The glowing theorem uses the well-known Rockafellar' s characterization of cyclically monotone functions. As a final important comment we note that in the context of the problems discussed in this paper, there is no loss of generality in dealing with one buyer. This follows from the fact that in a multi-buyers model, a randomized allocation rule is implementable if and only if for each buyer, for each fixed vector of valuations of all other buyers, the resulting one-buyer randomized allocation rule is implementable.
